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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. : 
DIANE MARIE NELSON, : Case No. 970163-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Nelson claimed in Point I of her Opening Brief that the 
trial court failed to determine the reliability of the eyewitness 
identification and make appropriate findings of fact prior to 
trial as required by Article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution and State v Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) . 
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the 
identification on the grounds that the showup was prejudicially 
suggestive and the identification unreliable. At the hearing on 
the motion to suppress defense counsel indicated that he believed 
the State intended to submit the preliminary hearing transcript. 
R. 161-62. Defense counsel stated that he too would be relying 
on portions of the transcript as well. R. 161-62. Defense 
counsel also made a proffer as to the testimony of Dr. Dodd, an 
expert in eye witness identifications. R. 168-69. Though the 
State filed a motion and memorandum in opposition to Nelson's 
motion to suppress, the State never submitted the transcript of 
the preliminary hearing into evidence. 1 The State's failure 
to submit any evidence at the hearing is explained by the fact 
that the trial court indicated at the outset its belief that the 
issue of reliability was essentially one for the jury.2 R. 162-
63. The trial court made it quite clear to defense counsel that 
he need not waste his time putting Dr. Dodd on the stand because 
the court had already ruled on the matter. R. 167-68. The 
State now claims that Nelson waived the issue. See State's 
Opening Brief, pg. 11-12. 
Lastly, though the State concedes on page 21 of its 
Opening Brief that challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence 
do not require preservation, Nelson invited error and/or waived 
the issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO REQUIRE 
THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE A THRESHOLD DETERMINATION 
OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE EYE WITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Contrary to the State's suggestion, Nelson did request an 
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Ramirez. R. 17. At that point, 
the burden was on the State to demonstrate the reliability of the 
1
. The burden is on the prosecution to demonstrate the 
admissibility of the eyewitness identification. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
at 778. 
2
. On page twelve of its Brief, the State argues that because 
the trial court did review the facts recited in the prosecutor's 
memorandum in opposition to Nelson's motion to suppress, the 
requirements of Ramirez were met. The prosecutor's memorandum is 
not, however, a substitute for an evidentiary hearing as the 
"facts" recited in a memorandum are not evidence. 
2 
identification. The State never had to meet its burden because 
the trial court ruled that the issue was one for the jury without 
hearing any evidence. Once the trial court had ruled, Nelson 
was not required to again request a Ramirez hearing to preserve 
the claim. 
The State's reliance on State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332 
(Utah 1993) to support its claim that Nelson must ask for a 
pretrial hearing to suppress the identification twice to preserve 
her claim is misguided. In Olsen, the defendant failed all 
together to object to the reliability of the eye witness 
identification. Id. at 335. Unlike, Olsen, in this case Nelson 
did file the appropriate motion, and that motion was denied. R. 
17. It is unclear just what the State expects defense counsel to 
do to preserve the claim in addition to filing the appropriate 
motion. 
The State also erroneously relies on State v. Lopez, 886 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) to support its claim that Nelson waived her 
request for a pretrial determination of the reliability of the 
identification. Like Olsen, the defendant in Lopez never asked 
the trial court to consider the admissibility of the 
identification under the Utah Constitution. Consequently, the 
claim was deemed waived. Id. at 1113. Olsen is therefore 
distinguishable from this case because Nelson did request a 
hearing and ruling on the reliability of the identification under 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution prior to trial. 
II. NELSON DID NOT INVITE ERROR OR WAIVE ANY 
CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. 
3 
The State concedes that challenges to the sufficiency of 
the evidence do not require preservation. See State's Opening 
Brief, pg. 21. However, the State asserts that counsel argued a 
contrary position to his claim on appeal that the State failed to 
establish that Nelson intended for the accomplice to use a knife 
in the commission of the offense. Id. This assertion is not 
supported by the record. Defense counsel argued at the close of 
the State's case that the charge against Nelson should be 
dismissed because the State did not establish that she encouraged 
the accomplice to use a weapon. R. 3 74-75. The trial court 
denied the motion on the grounds that the law does not require 
that the defendant know that the accomplice will use a dangerous 
weapon. R. 377-78. 
The State apparently believes that despite the trial 
court's ruling, counsel must request a jury instruction contrary 
to the trial judge's interpretation of the law to avoid inviting 
error. Given the trial court's rejection of defense counsel's 
argument, it was appropriate to agree not to argue the point 
before the jury. 
Lastly, the State's assertion that defense counsel never 
asked the trial court to consider the argument that Nelson had to 
intend the use of a knife and somehow misled the court on that 
issue is incorrect. At the close of the State's case defense 
counsel argued: 
You know, and it sort of leads me to the next 
argument I wanted to make before the jury comes 
in, and that would be an argument, obviously, 
that the state has not shown a prima facie case. 
4 
If they don't believe that she committed an 
aggravated robber, i.e. that she didn't have the 
knife, that she didn't encourage the use of the 
knife, or intend to use the knife, then this, as 
an alternative to that, then this simply ought to 
go to the jury as a robbery. 
R. 374-75. The invited error doctrine has two principal 
purposes. First, the trial court should be given an opportunity 
to address a claim of error. "Second, it discourages parties 
from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a 
hidden ground for reversal on appeal." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, defense counsel raised the issue of what 
constitutes the necessary mens rea and argued it at trial. The 
trial court considered the argument and rejected defendant's 
interpretation of the law. The trial court was not misled, and 
counsel did not "hide" the issue for a surprise attack on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and as set forth in her initial 
Opening Brief, Nelson respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the conviction and judgment entered in the trial court and 
remand the case to the trial court either for a new trial, or 
with orders to dismiss for insufficient evidence. 
SUBMITTED this ^S^ day of October, 1997. 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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